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Key Messages
• In the Middle East and Africa (MENA) region, concern with inclusive growth has been nurtured by the 
Arab uprisings after 2010. It is noteworthy that the uprisings in the main occurred against a somewhat 
paradoxical background of a period of relatively improved economic performance in the region.
• Interest in the relationship between growth and equity has long tradition in economics. In recent years 
this interest has been invigorated with new calls for greater attention to equity and distribution to 
accompany economic growth.
• This document defined for this purpose a new measurement method to evaluate the inclusiveness of 
growth. The index is made up of ten dimensions covering relevant aspects of growth could render 
inclusive. They include growth; the labor force and employment; health and demography; education; 
safety nets; social cohesion; gender ; the environment ; spatial aspects and governance.
• In general North African countries underperformed internationally and appeared in the lower median 
of rankings for all countries. Tunisia was an exception, however, given that her inclusive growth index 
is on par with that of China, Chile, Russia and Jordan, but lower than that for South Korea and 
Malaysia.
• Finally, in the wider Middle Eastern context, oil economies in general performed worst in terms of 
the inclusiveness of growth.
This document was prepared by the African Development Bank (AfDB). Designations employed in this publication do not imply
the expression of any opinion on the part of the institution concerning the legal status of any country, or the limitation of its
frontier. While efforts have been made to present reliable information, the AfDB accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any
consequences of its use.
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‘But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never
be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely
be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members
are poor and miserable.’
Adam Smith (1974: 181)
Interest in the relationship between growth and equity has a longtradition in economics. In recent years, this interest has been
invigorated with new calls for greater attention to equity and distribution
to accompany economic growth (for a review of earlier discussions,
see Hakimian, 2013). A number of developments have contributed to
this revival.  
In Asia, for instance, where rapid and sustained growth has brought
about a considerable dent in poverty, inequality has, however, proven
much more pervasive1. For its part, the recent ‘African Renaissance’
(with growth rates averaging around 6% per annum during 2001-08)
has failed to create a significant reduction in poverty while inequality
has been rising both between and within countries (JICA, 2012: 6). In
recent decades, therefore, we have witnessed a shift of emphasis away
from Pro-Poor Growth (PPG) policies in favour of policies that make
growth more ‘inclusive’ for the benefit of ‘the widest’ social and
economic groupings.  
Reflecting this, inclusive growth now features as a key element in 
the long-term strategic framework of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB, 2008 and 2014). The ADB has called for ‘...the continuation of
pro-growth economic strategies – but with a much sharper focus on
ensuring that the economic opportunities created by growth are 
available to all – particularly the poor – to the maximum extent possible’
(ADB, 2007: 13-14). Similarly, the African Development Bank has
recently highlighted inclusive growth as a key development objective,
conceptualising it in terms of four dimensions: economic, social, spatial
and political inclusion. This builds on the ADB’s earlier call for broadening
access ‘to economic opportunities for more people, countries and
regions, while protecting the vulnerable’ (AfDB, 2013: 10). 
A number of recent empirical studies have contributed to this change
in the policy climate. While Stiglitz (2012) and Picketty (2014) have
most notably shed new light on the relationship between growth and
equity, the upshot perhaps has come from an unexpected source – a
recent IMF study – which has found lower net inequality ‘to be robustly
correlated with faster and more durable growth’ (Ostry et al, 2014).
In the Middle East and Africa (MENA) region too, concern with inclusive
growth has been nurtured by the Arab uprisings after 2010. This interest
has partly emanated from the need to understand the root causes of
these upheavals and partly from the challenges in the post-uprising
era which have seen mounting expectations to improve the conditions
of the masses.  It is noteworthy that the uprisings in the main occurred
against a somewhat paradoxical background of a period of relatively
improved economic performance in the region. During 2000-10, for
instance, MENA’s real GDP growth averaged around 4%-5% a year
(Hakimian, 2011 and 2013) including in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and
Egypt, where mass revolts erupted. Yet, the region suffered from
economic and social disparities with persistently high unemployment,
particularly amongst the youth. The experience of the Arab region has
shown how a narrow focus on growth and a failure to consider its wider
ramifications can have far-reaching consequences. This has in turn put
the importance of growth in perspective by reminding us of the fact
that the type and pattern of growth are of significance as well. 
This paper builds on my earlier work on conceptual and empirical
aspects of inclusive growth in North Africa, which appeared as a Policy
Brief by the African Development Bank (Hakimian, 2013). That paper
focused, first and foremost, on an in-depth review of the concept of
inclusive growth and its application in the North African context. The
present paper extends that analysis in a number of important ways. 
First, here the focus is on the methodology for measuring inclusive
growth. This involves a fuller discussion of the broad dimensions (the
so-called ‘pillars’) on which the choice of individual indicators rests as
well as extending the number of countries and indicators that are used
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1.     Introduction
1 Rapid growth between 1990 and 2005, pushed down the number of those below the $1-a-day poverty line in Asia to 604 million (from 945 million) almost halving the headcount
ratio from 35% to 18%. It has been estimated that every 1% growth has been associated with an almost 2% reduction in poverty in Aisa, yet income inequality has increased over
time (see Ali, 2007a: 2-3 and 2007b).
in the dataset (153 countries in all). Second, a more thorough discussion
of measurement steps involved in the construction of composite
indicators is offered along with a discussion of the principal challenges
in constructing such an index. Third, we use two five-year period
averages to capture the developments in the decade before the Arab
uprisings better (2001-5 and 2006-10 as opposed to 2000-02 and
2008-10 as in the first paper). Last, but not least and ss discussed
later, the measurement methodology is also refined to get better results
(for instance arithmetic mean replaces the geometric mean method
used in the first paper to allow easier interoperation of the results).  
To contextualise the measurement effort, Section 2 offers a broad
review of thinking on inclusive growth in conceptual and policy terms.
This is then followed by a discussion of a number of common composite
indicators that are used to measure diverse socio-economic phenomena
and a critical examination of their uses and limitations in Section 3.
This sets a first step to measuring inclusive growth through a single
composite index. Section 4 focuses on an in-depth discussion of the
dimensions and the choice of indicators and methodological problems
encountered for constructing such an index. The computation results
are then presented and discussed followed by a critical discussion of
the findings, their meaning, significance and limitations. A final section
offers our summary and conclusions. 
In the next section, we discuss the meaning and significance of inclusive
growth and examine its broader implications for growth and
development before turning to its measurement and application in
North Africa.
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2.     Inclusive Growth: An Overview
Recent interest in inclusive growth has led to a flurry of contributionsdealing with a wide range of issues from the conceptual and
analytical complexities of the subject to its measurement difficulties 
and understanding specific country experiences. To a large extent, this
reflects the fact that growth is seen as a necessary, and not sufficient,
condition for a country’s ability to improve the welfare of its population.
The quality of growth, its sustainability as well as the degree to which
its benefits may extend to the widest sections of the society have thus
attracted increasing attention (see Tandon and Zhuang, 2007; Ali, 2007a
and 2007b; Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010; Klasen, 2010; and Felipe,
2010; Ianchovichina et al, 2009, among others; Hakimian, 2013, offers
a broad review of the recent literature). This interest has permeated
recent policy debates with equal vigour and inclusive growth now features
as a common development objective for both the ADB (2008) and the
AfDB (2013)2.  
Despite growing calls for growth to be made more inclusive, there is
not as yet a universally agreed notion of ‘inclusive growth’. While growth
is easier to define and measure, specifying what makes it ‘inclusive’ is
much more contentious. There is broad agreement that inclusive growth
is growth for ‘the benefit of most’, but ambiguities and disagreements
abound beyond this general idea. 
Taking a somewhat narrow approach, for instance, inclusive growth
can be characterised as ‘growth plus declining income disparities’
(Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010). In this formulation, inclusive growth
stretches the Pro-Poor-Growth (PPG) approach by adopting a wider
notion of who constitutes the poor. This definition, it must be noted,
excludes non-income considerations and, therefore, lends itself much
more easily to measurement (Klasen, 2010: 5).  
At another – opposite – extreme, inclusive growth is also sometimes
loosely referred to as ‘growth that benefits everyone’. In this – perhaps
its broadest sense – the concept seems to imply that growth should
‘benefit all stripes of society, including the poor, the near-poor, the
middle income groups, and even the rich’ (Klasen, 2010: 2). This is
equally problematic and highlights the fact that it is not just who is to
benefit from growth but the extent and distribution of such benefits are
important considerations and should not be overlooked. 
Both the narrow and broad definitions, however, suffer from common
limitations: they focus on income and are concerned with outcomes
only. This is seen in more recent formulations of inclusive growth which
seek to incorporate non-income elements too and depict it as a process
and not just an outcome (Klasen, 2010).
More recent contributions have stressed the role of opportunities in
generating inclusive growth. ADB’s Eminent Persons Group refers to
inclusive growth as ‘economic opportunities’ that are ‘available to all –
particularly the poor – to the maximum possible extent’ (ADB, 2007:
13-14; emphasis added)3. In its Strategy 2020, the ADB went further
by highlighting another two three pillars for inclusive growth: (a) broader
access to these opportunities and (b) safety nets to prevent extreme
deprivation (2008: 11-12).  
There is, however, some ambiguity over the main drivers that would
oversee or bring about improved access to opportunities, particularly
in relation to the role of state and public policy: are market forces
capable of bringing about the desired improvements in opportunities
for all or is state intervention justified to improve access to these? 
The former approach, which is arguably a ‘trickle down’ version of 
the inclusive growth approach, is seen in the World Bank’s 2006
Development Report on ‘Equity and Development’, which defines equity
broadly as ‘equal opportunities to pursue a life of one’s choosing.’ In
a similar light, Ianchovichina et al emphasise that inclusive growth is
about ‘raising the pace of growth and enlarging the size of the economy’
and not about ‘redistributing resources’ (2009: 3). 
For some, safety nets and social protection as well as the provision of
public and social goods are also important elements of the inclusive
2 The World Bank’s Commission on Growth and Development conceptualised inclusivity as encompassing ‘equity, equality of opportunity, and protection in market and employment’
(World Bank, 2008).  In 2008, ADB’s Strategy 2020 formalised interest in inclusive growth by adopting it as one of its strategic development agenda (the other two being environmentally
sustainable growth and regional integration; ADB, 2008).  The AfDB too has adopted it as one of its two strategic objectives for 2013-22 to broaden access ‘to economic opportunities
for more people, countries and regions, while protecting the vulnerable’ (the other strategic priority being green growth ‘to make growth sustainable’; see AfDB, 2013: 10).
3 Other ADB contributions have similarly characterised inclusive growth as ‘growth coupled with equal opportunities’ (Ali and Zhuang, 2007; Ali and Son 2007) or even more specifically,
‘inclusive growth focuses on both creating opportunities and making the opportunities accessible to all’ (Ali and Zhuang, 2007: 10).
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growth package. Ali and Son (2007) refer to the provision of social
opportunities (such as access to health and education) and how these
may vary with income levels.  Similarly, the World Bank’s Commission
on Growth and Development talks of inclusiveness as encompassing
‘equity, equality of opportunity, and protection in market and
employment’ (World Bank, 2008).
Focus on process helps to broaden the scope of the debate to include
social and institutional aspects of growth and development.  But it also
throws up new challenges. One of these is how to deal with a trade-off
between processes and outcomes (Hakimian, 2013). Is growth more – or
less – inclusive when improved processes result in poorer economic
outcomes? This can happen, for instance, when improvements in civil
rights and greater mass participation in social and political affairs (such
as following a revolution) may lead to short-term setbacks to economic
outcomes through greater instability and turmoil.  A converse scenario
is equally conceivable: if better outcomes are secured in the absence
of any commensurate improvements in process, does that make the
experience of growth undesirable? This can happen, for instance, with
an economic boom under an autocratic regime in the absence of any
real reforms or improvements in governance.   
Such issues could be better addressed if we had a commonly agreed
indicator for measuring inclusive growth (see McKinley, 2010, for an
early measurement attempt). Unsurprisingly, some of the conceptual
difficulties and challenges discussed above are also mirrored in
measurement difficulties and problems. Focusing on material outcomes
alone (for instance, in terms of better income and/or access to social
goods and safety net), measurement is generally easier given that such
outcomes are more readily quantifiable. However, when access to and
benefits from growth are envisaged in terms of processes, measurement
becomes harder and more complex. According to Klasen (2010) the
absence of a universally agreed notion of inclusive growth has led to
a wide range of measurement indicators which vary from ‘unclear’ to
‘straightforward’ to ‘technically difficult’.  
We can see that growing interest in inclusive growth has not been
matched by success over a universal definition that can help both
implement and monitor policies for inclusive growth. A variety of
approaches have emerged with emphases on different aspects of 
the concept. Narrower concepts stress outcomes (e.g., growth plus
equity) and are easier to measure and monitor. Wider concepts are
multi-dimensional and hence more ambitious in scope: they stress
improved opportunities for achieving better outcomes; they differentiate
between processes and outcomes and they widen outcomes to include
non-income aspects (social goods and safety nets). An implicit risk is
that an overambitious notion of inclusive growth becomes both
meaningless and impractical if it comes close to advocating ‘everything
for everyone’. 
The next section offers a review of a broad range of composite indices
or indicators which have been designed and used to encapsulate
multidimensional concepts such as human development, gender
inequality, water poverty, environmental performance and the like. This
will set the scene for our discussion of measuring inclusive growth
through a composite index which will be presented in Section 5.
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3.     Measurement Issues: Computing a Composite Index 
Adesire to quantify performance and policy outcomes has in recentyears led to the proliferation of a vast array of indicators concerned
with empirical measurement of economic and social development.
According to Nardo and Saisana this reflects the ‘the prevailing view
today… that evidence-based policy should temper, if not replace,
opinion-based policy’ (n.d.: 2). 
Some of these indicators are used as broad development indices 
while others are applied in more specific sectors or contexts. The World
Bank Development Indicators, for instance, comprises several hundred
indicators which are compiled for over two hundred countries annually
(World Bank, 2014). Similarly, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
were set to achieve specific development policy targets by 2015. These
have since been the subject of international cooperation and monitoring
by policy makers and the UN agencies since the turn of the century
(see UN, 2014) and will be replaced by Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) that are to shape the development agenda beyond 2015.  
More specific indicators have been no less popular. As we shall see
below, a variety of environmental indicators deal with different aspects
of climatic change and environmental sustainability; a host of water
indices address availability and quality issues (Sullivan, 2002; Sullivan,
C.A., et al (2003), and Sullivan and Jemmali, 2014); while poverty
indicators aim to capture a broad range of social and economic variables,
to name but a few. Reflecting this growing interest, there is a large
literature dealing with methodologies for developing social and economic
indicators (see for instance, UNICEF, 1995).
Alongside these large and diverse indicators – amounting to what Stiglitz
et al (2009) have described as ‘an eclectic dashboard’ – recent years
have also witnessed the growing popularity of composite indices or
indicators designed to encapsulate numerically more complex and
multidimensional concepts.  A composite index by construct synthesises
information conveyed by a large number of indictors into a single number
or score, which allows ready comparisons of performance for each
country across multiple dimensions4. This also lends itself to the
construction of country league tables based on rankings in which a
country’s performance can be easily tracked based on a single score
rather than across a large number of indicators and dimensions.
Reflecting this interest a number of methodological manuals have sought
to guide the construction and use of these indicators (see for instance,
OECD, 2008; Nardo et al, 2005; and Nardo and Saisana, n.d.).  
The UNDP’s pioneering Human Development Index (HDI) provides such
country rankings since 1990.  Developed as an alternative to conventional
measures of national development, HDIs offer a broader definition of
well-being and provide a composite measure based on equal weights
assigned to three basic dimensions of human development: income,
life expectancy and education. Since 2010, UNDP also offers an
inequality-adjusted score (IHDI) to capture the effect of inequality on
country rankings. These two measures would in fact be identical if there
were no inequalities. In that sense, ‘the IHDI is the actual level of human
development (taking into account inequality), while the HDI can be
viewed as an index of the potential human development that could be
achieved if there is no inequality’ (UNDP, 2012).
4 As a measure of broad academic interest in the subject, a search on Google Scholar of the words ‘composite indicator’ in March 2015 indicated about 664,000 entries against 328,000
reported by Nardo and Saisana in January 2009 and only 992 in October 2005 (n.d.: 1).
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Table 1: Human Development (HDI) and Inequality-Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) Rankings
for North African Countries, 2012 and 2013
Source: Data on rankings are from UNDP Human Development Reports (2013 and 2014). Normalised ranks are author’s calculations based on the equation: 
; where rj is a country’s rank for indicator j (in descending order) and mj is  the total number of countries for which data for indicator sj is available





HDI HDI HDI HDI HDI HDI HDI HDI
Algeria 93 - 93 - 50.3 - 50.5 -
Egypt 108 119 110 115 42.2 9.9 41.4 21.9
Libya 64 - 55 - 65.9 - 71.0 -
Morocco 131 130 129 129 29.7 1.5 32.2 12.3
Tunisia 90 - 90 - 51.9 - 52.2 -







_ 1( )sji = 100.
Table 1 gives the HDI and IHDI rankings for the five North African countries
for the period 2012 and 2013. Due to data limitations, although rising,
the number of countries for which IHDIs are available is still generally
much lower than for HDIs. We have therefore computed also the
normalised ranks for each indicator to be able to make meaningful
comparisons (on a linear scale of 0 and 100) regardless of the number
of the countries covered in each year’s dataset. The period covered is
interesting since it relates to the period either during or just after the 
so-called Arab Spring in some of these countries.
A number of interesting issues emerge here. First, normalised HDI
rankings indicate that Morocco, followed by Egypt, has the lowest of
all country rankings in the region: both are in the lower half globally
(Morocco’s rank is around 29%-31% and Egypt’s at 41%-42%). Tunisia
and Algeria by contrast rank at the median level (around the 50%
mark). Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, Libya’s HDI comes on top,
nearer the top one-third threshold for all countries (66% in 2012 and
rising to 71% in 2013).  
Inequality adjustments are too patchy and far from robust or stable to
warrant useful comparisons here. For both Morocco and Egypt – the
only two countries for which data are available – HDI rankings drop
significantly when taking inequality into account: to as low as 1.5% for
the former and 9.9% for the latter in 2012. Although the scores rise
significantly in the following year – jumping to almost 12% and 22%,
respectively – they remain significantly below their respective HDIs
indicating the pervasive effect of inequality in both countries.  
HDIs have in general inspired a new generation of composite
indicators which indicate  general unhappiness with GDP as a
measure of welfare (see Stiglitz et al, 2009 for a comprehensive
review). While to a large extent these have focused on conceptualising
and measuring broader and more representative indicators of welfare
and happiness (see O’Sullivan, 2014: 29-30 for a review of some of
these), others have extended and applied similar methodologies for
measurement in more specialised and specific contexts. Given the
large, and growing, number of such indicators, it is impossible to
offer but a selective review here. Below, we do this on a thematic
basis focusing on a few pertinent areas such as the environment,
gender and social progress. 
Measuring environmental sustainability and performance has been a
notable area of interest for those using composite indicators. One of
the earliest examples of these is the pioneering initiative by Yale and
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5 One review in 2003 notes over 500 sustainability-related indicator efforts: of these efforts, 67 were global (Hsu et al, 2013: 6). 
6 Some of the better known composite indicators in this field are: Ecological Footprint and Living Planet Index (both produced by WWF with Zoological Society of London and Global
Footprint Network), Better Life Index (OECD), Well-being Index (International Union for Conservation of Nature, IUCN). Among the so-called ‘Green Economy Indictors’ one may 
mention: Low-Carbon Competitiveness Index or LCCI (Climate Institute with analysis by Vivid Economics), Climate Change Performance Index or CCPI (Germanwatch, Climate Action
Network – Europe) and Global Green Economy Index  or GGEI (Dual Citizen). These vary a lot in their scope, key components and specific indicators used and in their methodologies
and country coverage. For a useful summary and overview of these and other indicators, see Barr (2013: Annex 1 and Annex 2). 
Columbia Universities in 2000 to develop an Environmental Sustainability
Index (ESI)5. In 2010, ESI was revised to offer an alternative index called
the Environmental Performance Index (EPI). Whereas ESI focused on
ranking countries on multiple components of environmental sustainability
(using as many as 76 indicators), the pared down EPI now focuses on
the measurement of environmental performance with the help of 20
indicators centred around the two principal objectives of: (a) improving
environmental health and (b) promoting ecosystem vitality and sound
natural resource management (Hsu et al, 2013 for details of the
methodology and weightings used). 
As with EPI in general, the popularity and application of indictors
measuring environmental performance and sustainability criteria have
been on the rise6. Table 2 provides a summary of estimated North African
country ranks based on two such composite indicators produced by
EPI and the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI). The latter has
a narrower focus than EPI (since it is emission based) and covers far
fewer countries (61 countries which account for over 90% of the global
energy-related CO2 emission). EPI by contrast covers nearly three times
as many countries (178) and gives an indication of the direction and
extent of improvement over the past decade (2002-12).
Table 2: Selected Environmental Performance Rankings for North African Countries,
2012-2014

















Algeria 92 +2.48 42 49 46.6 20.0
Egypt 50 +9.76 30 26 72.3 58.3
Libya 120 +4.17 - - 32.8 -
Morocco 81 +6.66 20 15 54.8 76.7
Tunisia 52 +6.87 - - 71.2 -
Out of (Total countries) 178 178 61 61 178 61
It can be seen that the EPI data put both Egypt and Tunisia at the top
quartile of the performance index globally (with absolute ranks of 50
and 52 respectively out of 178 countries and normalised or percentile
ranks of around 71%-72%). Algeria and Morocco rank around the
median for all countries for which data is available (47%-55%) and Libya
appears in the bottom one third (32.8). Moreover, all five countries
indicate an improvement in their environmental performance as a whole
since 2002 with Egypt coming on top (an improving index of nearly 10%
or the third most improving country worldwide). CCPI data, however,
cover only three of these five countries and curiously perhaps give a
very different picture pertaining largely to the CO2 emissions situation
for these countries: Algeria is relegated to the bottom fifth and the order
for Morocco and Egypt is reversed (the former rises to the top quartile
whereas the former drops to just below the sixth decile). 
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The use of similar composite indicators has also gained popularity in
other fields. In the gender domain, for instance, several indices have
been developed (see van Staveren, 2013, for a full discussion of five of
these). Here we mention two of the principal indicators that are used
to measure inequality or gaps between women and men: the Gender
Inequality Index (GII) and the Global Gender Gap Index (GGI). The former
has been produced since 2010 by UNDP along with its annual HDI
reports and uses a method which is similar to the Inequality-adjusted
Human Development Index (IHDI) albeit with different dimensions to
quantify gender inequality (GII, 2014a for scope and methodology). The
latter was introduced by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2006 and
offers a framework for measuring the scope of gender disparities based
on four principal areas: economic participation and opportunity,
educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.
Like GII, it too provides country rankings that allow for comparisons
across countries and over time (GGI, 2013: 4-6 for methodology and
scope). 
Table 3 gives data for the North African countries for these two and
another composite index which combines environment with gender 
to produce an Environment and Gender Index (EGI). The latter offers a
combined assessment of the conditions for ‘gender equality and
women's empowerment in the environmental arena’ based on 27
indicators which are divided into 6 categories for 72 countries7. 
7 These six categories and their weights are: Livelihood (20%); Ecosystem (10%); Gendered rights and participation (20%); Governance (20%); Gendered education and assets (20%);
and Country reported activities (10%); (see EGI, 2013: 23).
Table 3: Selected Gender Inequality Rankings for North African Countries, 
2013-2014
Source:  Data on GII ranks are taken from GII (2014b), GGI ranks data are from GGI (2013) and EGI rankings from EGI (2013). Normalised ranks are author’s calculations based on



















Algeria 81 124 59 47.0 11.2 18.3
Egypt 130 125 52 14.6 6.7 28.2
Libya 40 - - 74.2 - -
Morocco 92 129 49 39.7 4.5 32.4
Tunisia 48 - - 68.9 - -
Out of (Total countries) 152 136 72 152 136 72
The picture that emerges here is far from uniform or consistent for these
five countries. GII – the only data source that includes Libya and Tunisia
as well – puts them at the top of regional rankings: Libya at 40 globally
out of 152 countries or in the top quartile on the normalised scale, and
Tunisia at 48 and top one-third, respectively. The same source accords
Egypt the lowest ranking (130 out of 152 countries or in the bottom
15%. This is in sharp contrast to GGI which puts Algeria, Egypt and
Morocco consistently at a very low ranking of 124-129 out of 136
countries (firmly in the bottom decile globally). The inclusion of
environment in the gender index, however, seems to work in favour of
these three countries as EGI raises their ranks. In all and comparing
Tables 2 and 3 together it appears as if North African countries score
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better on environment (with the exception of Libya) but the gender
picture is generally very weak and unhelpful to their rankings.
More recently, the composite indicator approach has been deployed
to measure and develop a more comprehensive Social Progress Index
(SPI). This fairly comprehensive and wide ranging indicator epitomises
the dissatisfaction with GDP as a measure of welfare as mentioned
above. This is reflected in the fact that the SPI excludes GDP altogether
(whether per capita GDP or GDP growth rate) as well as other economic
criteria from the construction of what it considers to be ‘social’ progress.
Accordingly, it focuses on four specific components to construct each
of the three principal dimensions it uses to designate such progress.
These are: (a) Basic Human Needs (nutrition, water and sanitation,
shelter and personal safety); (b) Well-being (access to knowledge,
access to information, health and ecosystem sustainability); and (c)
Opportunity (personal rights, personal freedom and choice, tolerance
and inclusion and access to advanced education). The index is then
constructed by applying equal weights to each of the four components
and the three dimensions and computing an arithmetic average of
these to estimate the SPI (a total of 54 detailed indicators are used for
the 12 components used; see Stern et al, 2014 for methodology and
scope). 
Results are available for four of the five North African countries under
study here and the latest summary data for 2014 are given in Table 4
(Libya is excluded due to data limitations).  





Opportunity Overall SPI Normalised ranks for
SPI (max=100; min=0)
Algeria 59 83 116 87 34.4
Egypt 58 66 119 84 36.6
Morocco 73 90 107 91 31.3
Tunisia 56 77 90 69 48.1
Out of (Total countries) 132 132 132 132 132
Table 4: Social Progress (SPI) Indicator Rankings for North African Countries, 2014
Again, Tunisia comes on top with the best SPI ranking (with a close
to median ranking globally or 69th position out of 132 countries). Algeria,
Egypt and Morocco, however, are in the bottom third of the global
social progress country distributions. It also appears that for all these
four countries, the SPI is helped by better than average ‘Basic Human
Needs’ rankings but is dragged down by the ‘Opportunity’ dimension.
Since the indicators underlying opportunity are mainly to do 
with political rights and opportunities (ie, personal rights and 
freedom, tolerance and access to advanced education), according to
this index, therefore, the region has a long way to go to benefit from
opening up and governance structures even after the recent popular 
uprisings. 
Another notable approach which uses a composite index methodology
is the UN’s Inclusive Wealth Index (IWI) which has been piloted for a
group of twenty countries representing approximately three-fourth of
the world’s GDP and more than half of the total population over the
period 1990-20088. This index aims to provide quantitative information
on, and an analysis of, long-term perspectives on ‘human well-being
and measures of sustainability’ (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012: xxi). 
8 These are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, UK, USA, 
Venezuela. Unfortunately, none of the North African countries is included in this study and Saudi Arabia is the only Middle Eastern country included. 
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The IWI seeks to measure the social value of capital assets of nations
by including Natural Capital (NC) and Human Capital (HC) to the more
traditional economic concept of Manufactured (or produced) Capital.
The Inclusive Wealth Index is thus measured according to the following
formula:
Wealth = Pmc x Manufactured Capital (MC) + Phc x Human Capital  
(HC) + Pnc x Natural Capital (NC)
Where Pmc, Phc and Pnc are respective prices (weights) for each type of
capital. To measure only real or changes in the physical quantities of
capital stock, prices are kept constant (at US$ 2000).  One main feature
of this index is that – contrary to GDP – it focuses on stock metrics
(rather than flows) and thus investment is expressed in terms of real
changes in the capital base of each country as follows (UNU-IHDP and
UNEP, 2012: 29-30):
ΔWealth = Inclusive Investment = Pmc x Δ MC + Phc x Δ HC + Pnc x   
ΔNC
Although still in its infancy stages, the main attraction of this index is
perhaps its emphasis on the preservation of stocks as the assets base
of a country and for shedding light on what happens to this base as
output changes over time. This is seen, for example, from two of the
key findings of the 2012 report according to which a decline in natural
capital was a key source of difference in performance between IWI and
growth of GDP and HDI: ‘25 percent of assessed countries, which
showed a positive trend when measured by GDP per capita and the
HDI, were found to have a negative IWI’ (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012:
273). This is well illustrated in the case of Saudi Arabia – the only MENA
country included in the index – which experienced a drop of 18% overall
in its IWI despite growth in its human and manufactured capitals. This
is mainly due to a massive draw down (-39%) in its natural capital
(principally fossil fuels) during 1990-2008.  
Last but not least, another area where the use of composite indicators
has proven popular is studies dealing with water resources and scarcity.
Earlier interest in physical and hydrological aspects of water have in
more recent years given way to a more multidimensional understanding
which maps out water scarcity into its physical, economic, managerial,
institutional and political dimensions. A large literature has emerged
which emphasises the need to link up the biophysical and social worlds
to produce a better assessment of water scarcity (see, for instance,
Molle and Mollinga, 2003; Salameh, 2000; Sullivan et al, 2003).
One approach in this school has advocated the development of 
a Water Poverty Index (WPI) as a composite and multidimensional
measurement of water scarcity (see Sullivan, 2002, for an early
formulation). The approach has been widely adopted and extended 
to a wide range of countries and regions globally (Heidecke, 2006;
Jemmali and Matoussi, 2013). More recently, Sullivan and Jemmali
(2014) have applied it to compute a Water Poverty Index consisting of
five components: (Resources, Access, Capacity, Use and Environment).
This approach enables them to offer a different global map of water
scarcity categorised by different bands of scarcity and broken down
by each component.
To sum up this section, we have discussed and illustrated how
composite indices have become increasingly popular in estimations of
single quantitative measures of multidimensional concepts such as
gender, environment, water, wealth and social progress. These indices
aim to synthesise information conveyed by a large number of indictors
into a single number or score, which allows ready comparisons of
performance for each country across multiple dimensions. They thus
lend themselves to the construction of country league tables based
on rankings in which a country’s performance can be easily tracked
based on a single score rather than across a large number of indicators
and dimensions. 
The next section applies this approach to the construction of a composite
index to measure inclusive growth. Our methodology is carefully
explained before presenting and discussing the findings and empirical
estimations for North African countries. We then offer a critical evaluation
of their uses and limitations after that.  
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4. Data and Methodology: Constructing a Composite Inclusive Growth Index
As discussed in the last section, composite indices have gainedpopularity and seen wider application in different contexts. The
choice of a single measure or indicator for inclusive growth is, however,
in early stages9. This section builds on the discussion above and offers
a methodology for measuring a composite index for this purpose.
Despite the growing application of these indices, there is no agreed
overall framework for computing them. Overall success will depend on
several factors, ‘related both to the quality of elementary data used to
build the indicator and the quality of procedures used to do it’ (Nardo
et al, 2005: 31). But there is also broad agreement that the development
of such an index will have to be guided by several criteria. Amongst 
the most widely applied criteria are: (a) Comparability: data used for
constructing an index have to be comparable across the widest set of
indicators and dataset. This can in turn reduce coverage, whether in
terms of countries or indicators that can be used; (b) Accuracy:
inaccuracy of data can erode the usefulness of the index as the latter
is ultimately only as credible as the underlying data which it uses; (c)
Flexibility: indices are useful when their construct allows for flexibility
and adaptability for data changes and/or use of weights and aggregation
methods especially over time; (d) Transparency: data and indicator
selection as well use of weights and computation methodologies should
be both accessible and readily comprehensible for users; and finally, 
(e) Completeness: incomplete data and missing values can affect 
the credibility of the computations and the usefulness of the index 
(Hsu et al, 2013: 18-9 for an elaboration of these in the environmental
context; also Nardo et al, 2005: 32).
The OECD Methodological Handbook highlights a number of key steps
that are pertinent in constructing composite indicators (Nardo et al,
2005; OECD; 2008).  
First, conceptual clarity is needed to provide a sound basis for, and
guide the selection of, indicators in the construction of an index. Without
a sound theoretical framework, the indicators selected for aggregation
will fail ‘the fitness-for-purpose principle’ (Nardo et al, 2005: 10).
Achieving conceptual clarity is, however, easier in some contexts than
others10. As have already seen achieving conceptual clarity over inclusive
growth remains a challenge – a factor that will inevitably complicate
measurement and lead to different quantification approaches. 
Second, data selection is another major challenge and affects the
choice of indicators from a practical point of view since lack of relevant
data will limit the constructor's ability to build sound composite
indicators. Common concerns for the choice of data are: measurability,
country coverage, relevance to the phenomenon under measurement
and relationship to each other. In general, data availability is less of an
issue for more standard indicators but coverage and applicability
difficulties rise with more specialised requirements (such as indicators
for employment structures and unemployment characteristics or for
measures of poverty and inequality in contrast to standard income and
health statistics). In practice, data selection can be quite subjective
and given a scarcity of internationally comparable quantitative data,
composite indicators often also include qualitative (soft) data from
surveys and policy reviews.
Third and related to this is exploratory data analysis which should be
conducted to investigate the overall structure of the indicators and to
assess the suitability of the data set and to explain the methodological
choices such as weighting, aggregation, etc. 
Fourth, missing values need to be considered and addressed as they
can affect the aggregation methodology11.  
Fifth, normalisation would be required in most cases to make indicators
comparable. This happens, for instance, because country data coverage
is not uniform for different indicators. Below, we shall see that re-scaling
will be necessary to render these rankings comparable. This is necessary
9 See McKinley (2010) for an early example; Barr (2013) for broader discussion and a more recent example; and Ncube et al (2013) for a different approach; the discussion here builds,
on and goes beyond, the approach offered in Hakimian (2013). In 2011, the ADB too introduced a set of 35 indicators to fill in the gap in targeting inclusive growth in operational terms
(ADB, 2011).
10 For instance, the Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) developed by the World Economic Forum establishes a clear link between its conceptual framework and the structure of the
composite indicator by defining it in terms of three broad categories: (a) the macroeconomic environment, (b) the quality of public institutions, and (c) technology. By contrast, a concept
such as human happiness would be much more difficult to define and this is reflected in its measurement difficulties as well (O’Sullivan, 2014: 29-30 for a review of these issues). 
11 For instance, use of Factor Analysis requires full data sets and no allowance can be made for missing data (O’Sullivan, 2014: 14).  
because individual country ranks in respect of certain indicators are
rarely for an identical number of countries (given data problems
mentioned above). 
Sixth, even with good quality data and appropriate normalisation
approaches, the question of how to decide weights and what
aggregation methods to use are issues to consider.  For instance, using
additive or multiplicative aggregation methods affects the index – an
issue that has received attention in the literature (see for instance, Garriga
and Foguet, 2010 and Sullivan and Jemmali, 2014: 11)12.  
A last issue concerns the results. Once computed, they should be
checked for robustness and sensitivity analysis should be conducted
to assess the significance of each sub-component and individual
indicator in the overall country performances (see Nardo et al, 2005,
and OECD, 2008: 20-21, for a useful checklist and an extended
discussion of these issues).  
These steps or practical considerations are highlighted in the following
section which draws from a choice of different indicators to construct
a combined single measure for Inclusive Growth (IG) for North African
countries. This will then be used to compare their performance both
over time and in relation to a selection of other peer countries. 
4.1 Broad Components or Dimensions
We saw in Section 3 that the construction of composite indicators is
often based on the choice of broad dimensions or components. These
allow for the choice of specific indicators to be justified as well as to
structure and organise them into readily comprehensible analytical
categories. At a higher level of abstraction, these dimensions or ‘pillars’
reflect the theoretical framework within which a multidimensional concept
is measured. The same consideration applies to the measurement of
inclusive growth.
In AfDB’s formulation, inclusive growth is formulated in terms of four such
broad components: economic, social, spatial and political (AfDB, 2013).
Similarly, the ADB has classified its inclusive growth concept within the
following thematic construct or pillars: (a) income and non-income poverty
and inequality; (b) creation-of-opportunities; (c) access-to-opportunities;
(d) social protection; and (e) good governance and institutions. 
Figure 1 shows an alternative classification which brings together five
such components: economic, social, political, spatial and environmental
dimensions. Each of these encompasses pertinent aspects of growth
that can make growth inclusive or otherwise through the choice of
appropriate sub-indicators as discussed in the next section.  
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12 The HDI switched to geometric mean in 2010 although this is less intuitive than the arithmetic mean approach on which it was originally based. 




4.2 Selection of Indicators 
Next we further refine the components in Figure 1 above by further
unpacking the first two components (Economic and Social) into narrower
(sub-)dimensions. The Economic pillar now captures growth and jobs,
and the Social pillar health, education, social protection and gender. We
thus arrive at a more disaggregated set of ten components in Table 5
below. Of these the first seven dimensions refer to socio-economic pillars
and the rest capture political, spatial and environmental dimensions.
Next, a comprehensive list of 30 detailed performance indicators are
drawn up to capture the various aspects of inclusive growth. 
Although this gives us a useful checklist for measuring and monitoring
inclusive growth, in practice real choice is constrained by data availability.
With this in mind, in Table 6 we refine the list down to eight broad
components and a total of 14 individual indicators. Data sources –
indicated in the same table – are mostly from the World Bank’s
Development Indicators (WDI) with a few others – GII, EPI and CPI –
themselves composite indices on gender inequality, environmental
performance and corruption perception, respectively. 
Apart from considerations of data availability, the indicators are also
selected carefully to obtain a more holistic estimation of inclusive growth.
They are mainly output indicators with the exception of two input
indicators that are explained and justified below. Data used refer not to
individual indicator values or scores but to country rankings obtained
and normalised (re-scaled between 0 and 100) to take into account
variations in the total number of countries for which ranks are obtained.
Further, to smooth out annual fluctuations in individual ranks, five-year
averages are used for the two sub-periods of 2001-05 and 2006-10
deliberately chosen because of their proximity to the events leading to
the Arab uprisings in the region. This analysis can be easily updated to
reflect developments the next quinquennial period (2011-15) when full
data become available in due course. Further, due to data gaps, for
some indicators (such as ‘Gender Inequality’ and ‘Inequality & Poverty’),
we have used data as close to these periods as possible. 
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Table 5: Conceptualising Inclusive Growth
Broad Dimensions Performance Indicators
1. Growth 
1. GDP per capita (in PPP)
2. GDP growth rate
3. GDP per capita growth rate
2. Labour Force & Employment
4. Employment status (formal/informal)
5. National unemployment rate
6. Youth unemployment rate
3. Health and Demographic
7. Life expectancy
8. Infant mortality (under 5)
9. Public health expenditure
4. Education 1. Female to male enrolment ratios2. Public spending on education 
5. Safety Nets and Distribution
12. Income distribution (Gini index)
13. Poverty (headcount ratio)
14. Intergenerational disparities in income and wealth 
15.Welfare and social security
6. Social Cohesion
16. Youth inclusion 
17. Ethnic/national inclusion 
18. Racial and religious harmony and tolerance
7. Gender 
19. Female/male access to education 
20. Female labour force participation rates









28. Regional disparities in per capita income and wealth
29. Regional disparities in unemployment (rural/urban and 
coastline/mainland)
10. Governance 30. Transparency International Index
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A brief discussion of each of the eight broad components used and the
justification for their inclusion is given below. 
Growth: Real per capita GDP growth is included to capture economic
performance taking into account population growth. As a sensitivity analysis,
GDP growth rate was also considered but we decided to drop it due to
very high correlation with the per capita GDP growth rate values. GDP per
capita itself is also not included here since our focus is on performance
rather than on the level of income or size of a country’s economy as such.
Labour Force and Employment: Three indicators are included to
reflect on the structure of employment and to capture the scope and
extent of job creation. The first – the wage and salaried as % of total
employment – indicates the extent to which those employed are located
in the formal sector and are covered by contracts rather than working
in family units or as self-employed. The other two indicators – adult
and youth employment-to-population ratios – refer to the proportion
of a country's population which are employed. These two are proxies
for the extent of national and youth unemployment rates in a country.
The data used here, taken from the World Bank’s Development
Indicators, come from ILO’s modelled estimates for each country. This
was necessary as the national estimates for both these indicators (also




Individual Indicators (sj) No of countries for which
data is available (mj)
Data Source
2001- 05 2006-10




2. Wage & Salaried (% of total employment) 
3. Employment-to-Population Ratios (% of 15+)













5. Life Expectancy at Birth 
6. Mortality Rate Under-5  (per 1,000)











8. Ratio of Female to Male Secondary Enrolment (%)







Gender 10. Gender Inequality Index (GII) 133 134 GII











Governance 14. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 144 152 CPI
Total Number of Countries in the Dataset 153 153
Table 6: Selected Indicators for Computation of Inclusive Growth Index
Sources:   WDI (2014); GII (2014b); EPI (2014) and Transparency International (2014) for the CPI (Corruption Perception Index)
Gender: To capture the gender aspects of inclusivity, we rely on a
composite index – Gender Inequality Index (GII) – which was
introduced by the UNDP in 2010 as a substitute for its traditional
Gender-related Development Index (GDI; see Section 3 above). GII
shows ‘the loss to potential achievement in a country due to gender
inequality’. It uses a number of carefully chosen indicators to ‘reflect
women’s reproductive health status, their empowerment and labour
market participation relative to men’s’ (GII, 2014a and b). Due to
data limitations, we have used back-casted data for the years 2000
and 2005 to obtain an average for the period 2000-2005 and data
for 2005 and 2010 to get an average for the period 2005-10,
respectively.
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Environment: Here too we use another composite index –
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) – to capture the various and
multi-faceted aspects of a country’s environmental performance. As
with gender, there is no shortage of composite indicators (see Section
3 above for details). EPI is preferred to other composite indicators
due to its focus on performance (rather than selected aspects of
climatic change or environmental risk) and concern with outcomes
rather than policies or inputs. EPI uses a number of detailed indicators
to measure performance across two broad categories of:
Environmental Health (with a weight of 40%) and Ecosystem Vitality
(with a weight of 60%; see Hsu et al, 2013 for details of the
methodology and weightings used). The former focuses on health
impacts (child mortality in the age range 1-5), air quality and access
to water and sanitation (See Hsu et al, 2013 for details of the
methodology and weightings used). The latter (Ecosystem Vitality)
embraces such indicators as water resources (wastewater treatment),
agriculture (subsidies and pesticides regulation), forests (change in
forest cover), fisheries (coastal shelf fishing pressure and fish stock),
biodiversity and habitat (protected areas) and climate and energy
(CO2 emissions per unit GDP and from electricity and heat production).
Due to data limitations we have used an average for the period 
2002-05 and 2006-10 respectively for each of two periods under
consideration in our study (2001-05 and 2006-10). 
Inequality and Poverty: Inequality is measured by the Gini index and
poverty by poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP). The latter reflects the depth
as well as incidence of poverty and is measured as the mean shortfall
from the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line.
Both measures are available from the World Bank’s Development
Indicators although coverage is limited to 85-97 countries in our 
dataset only. 
Governance: Finally, governance is also represented through a
composite index – the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) – which is
produced annually by Transparency International. This index ranks
countries according to perception of corruption in the public sector
based on different assessments and business opinion surveys relating
to the administrative and political aspects of corruption. The questions
used to compile the index relate to ‘bribery of public officials, kickbacks
in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and questions
that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption
efforts’ (Transparency International, 2014). Scores are assigned on a
scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Considering that CPI is
perception based, it is not suitable for trend analysis or for monitoring
changes in the perceived levels of corruption over time for all countries.
However, due to data limitations, we have included this index for the
period 2001-10 to capture governance rankings for different countries.
In practice, there is a lot of variation in the number of countries 
for which an index is available over time with coverage rather much
more limited in earlier years but improving noticeably for the more 
recent ones. Period averages for 2001-05 and 2006-10 are therefore 
worked out taking into account missing values for individual years and 
countries.  
4.3 Missing Values
The selection of indicators as well as countries included in our dataset
(153 in total) reflects careful consideration of data availability. As stated
above, most indicators are readily available from standard sources
such as the World Bank’s Development Indicators. However, availability
decreases noticeably for some indicators such as the Gini index 
and Poverty Gap as well as for the Wage & Salaried (as % of total
employment; see Table 6 above). 
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Sources: Author’s calculations (see Appendix Table 1)
2001-05 2006-10 Total Missing Data
Points
No % of Total
North Africa
Algeria Poverty; Inequality Poverty; Inequality 4 1.3
Egypt - - 0 0
Libya Public Spending on Education; Wage& Salaried; Poverty; Inequality
Public Spending on Education; Wage
& Salaried; Poverty; Inequality
8 2.6
Morocco - - 0 0
Tunisia - - 0 0
GCC States
Bahrain Poverty; Inequality Poverty; Inequality 4 1.3
Kuwait Poverty; Inequality Poverty; Inequality 4 1.3
Oman Poverty; Inequality; GII Poverty; Inequality; GII 6 2
Qatar Poverty Poverty 2 0.6
Saudi Arabia Poverty; Inequality; Wage & Salaried Poverty; Inequality; Wage & Salaried 6 2
UAE Female enrolment; Public Spendingon Education; Poverty; Inequality
Female enrolment; Public Spending
on Education; Poverty; Inequality
8 2.6
Other Middle East
Iran Poverty; Inequality 2 0.6
Iraq Public Spending on Education; Wage& Salaried; Poverty; Inequality
Public Spending on Education; Wage
& Salaried
6 2
Israel Poverty Poverty; Inequality 3 0.98
Jordan Public Spending on Education Public Spending on Education 2 0.6
Lebanon Poverty; Inequality; GII Poverty; Inequality; GII 6 2
Syria - Poverty; Inequality 2 0.6
Turkey - - 0 0
Yemen - Poverty; Inequality 2 0.6
Table 7: Missing Values for 'Inclusive Growth' Indicators, 2001-05 and 2006-10
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( )sji = 100.
Availability also varies over time with data missing for certain periods
for different countries. Table 7 below summarises missing data for the
14 indicators used for each of the MENA countries for both the 
2001-5 and 2006-10 sub-periods. It can be seen that in North Africa,
the gaps are most serious for Libya (with eight missing data points)
and, to a lesser extent, for Algeria (with four missing data points). This
is in sharp contrast with Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all of which have
full datasets in this regard. Elsewhere, the UAE and Oman lead with the
biggest data gaps (with eight and six missing data points, respectively)
followed by Iraq and Lebanon (each with six missing data points). 
In general, missing data reduce the estimation accuracy. This is
specially an issue for the Inclusive Growth index since the gaps for
‘Poverty & Inequality’ indicators seem widest, which are arguably at
the centre of any such computations. The results therefore have to
be interpreted carefully.
4.4 Aggregation
Additive or multiplicative aggregation methods have been much
discussed in the literature and are widely used (see, Garriga and
Foguet, 2010; Sullivan and Jemmali, 2014).  A multiplicative method
computes an overall inclusive score for each country (IGi) as a
geometric mean of all its different indicators (equation 1), rescaled into
standardised values (equation 2):
IGi = √s1i.s2i…sji (1)
where: 
(i = 1,… m:  country i  included in the dataset); 
(j = 1,… n:  indicator j  included in the dataset). As shown in Table 6,
m=153 countries and n=14 indicators in our dataset.  
Sj is a standardised score for the rankings obtained in respect of
indicator j for country i. Standardised scores are obtained using the
following formula (for indicator j for each country i):
(2)
where rj is a country’s rank in respect of indicator j in (descending order)
and mj is the total number of countries for which data for indicator sj
is available. This takes into account the variable number of countries
for which data is available for specific indicators. In general, data
limitations reduce country coverage for some variables such as inequality
and the structure of employment (percentage of the wage and salaried
in total employment) and, to a lesser extent, gender inequality (GII). 
It is arguable that missing data of this nature could bias the rankings
in favour of less developed countries in which disparities in these areas
are more serious. 
The arithmetic mean approach, however, is more intuitive which is why
we have adopted it in this study too (Hakimian 2013, used the geometric
mean method). This can be computed by averaging the sum of the
normalised values for each indicator sj for country i, each component
and each indicator within that component are equally weighted. 
IGi =  ∑i=1 wj . sji (3)
where: 
(i = 1,… m:  country i included in the dataset), m=153 countries;
(j = 1,… n:  indicator j included in the dataset).
The difference between the present study and the last paper
(Hakimian 2013) goes beyond the calculation method and includes
differences in data coverage as well as the choice of indicators and
the dimensions of inclusive growth. The previous study used a
database of 193 countries and comprised 13 indicators. This paper
has streamlined the database to include a selection of 153 countries
for which key data are available and for which missing data could
be minimised (see Section 4.3 above). We use 14 indicators based
on a broader choice of dimensions and categories. The additional
dimensions used are: ‘Environment’, ‘Gender' and ‘Inequality’. The
two approaches also differ in that the earlier paper used three-year
moving averages for 2000-02 and 2008-10, respectively, whereas
the current one uses five-year averages for 2001-05 and 2006-10




The indice is computed with equal weights applied to all components
(1/8) which is then equally spread between each indicator within 
that component. This results in wk = 1= 12.5%  for ‘single indicator’
components such as ‘Growth’, ‘Gender’, ‘Environment’, and
‘Governance’. For the three indicators under ‘Health & Demographics’
and ‘Labour Force & Employment’ weights are smaller: 
wj = 1 = 4.17%. Similarly, a weight of 6.25% applies to the two
indicators making up ‘Education’ and ‘Inequality & Poverty’.     
4.5 Data Exploration
Before proceeding to compute the IG index, we conduct an exploratory
data analysis to examine possible relationships between the selected
indicators. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 offer Pearson Correlation matrices for
the 14 indicators in our analysis for both periods. Values indicating high
correlations (in excess of 0.70) are highlighted in bold for ease of
reference. 
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Notes:  *  Equal weights for all indicators (wi = 1/14=7.15%)
**  Equal weights are assigned to each component (=1/8=12.5%) and then to each indicator within that component depending on the number)
Components (CK) Individual Indicators (sj) Weights (%)
Growth 1. Real per capita GDP Growth 12.5
Labour Force & Employment
2. Wage & Salaried (% of total employment) 4.17
3. Employment-to-Population Ratios (% of 15+) 4.17
4. Employment-to-Population Ratios (% of 15-24) 4.17
Health & Demographics
5. Life Expectancy at Birth 4.17
6. Mortality Rate Under-5  (per 1,000) 4.17
7. Public Health Expenditure (% GDP) 4.17
Education
8. Ratio of Female to Male Secondary Enrolment (%) 6.25
9. Public Spending on Education (% of total) 6.25
Gender 10. Gender Inequality Index (GII) 12.5
Environment 11. Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 12.5
Inequality & Poverty
12. Gini Index 6.25
13. Poverty Gap at $2 a day 6.25
Governance 14. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 12.5
Total 100
Table 8: Aggregation Methods Based on Different Indicator Weights
8x3
8
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It can be seen that some indicators have high Pearson correlations
with others. This is particularly evident for some of the composite indices
used such as GII, EPI and CPI. For instance, GII which indicates gender
inequality shows a very high and positive correlation with life expectancy,
child mortality, structure of employment (% of wage & salaried), EPI,
poverty gap and CPI. Some of this could be due to possible overlap
between composite indices as they are typically made of a number of
sub-indicators. For instance, GII is constructed from the following: 
• Maternal mortality ratio
• Adolescent fertility rate
• Population with at least secondary education, female/male ratio 
• Shares in parliament, female/male ratio 
• Labour force participation rate, female/male ratio.
Here the most obvious or direct possible overlap with our chosen
indicators is the female/male secondary education ratio (we use
enrolment ratios). However, it is much more likely that, indirectly, many
of these indicators are influenced strongly by other factors not present
in our selection, most notably the level of economic development and
per capita income levels, which no doubt affect the country rankings
in our dataset.
Similarly, as we saw in Section 3 above, EPI is constructed from a
total of 20 indicators which centre around two principal components:
(a) improving environmental health and (b) promoting ecosystem vitality
and sound natural resource management. A close examination of
these indicators reveals no direct or evident overlap with those used
for calculating GII (see Hsu et al, 2013 for details)13. Again, a more
credible cause for these high Pearson correlations is likely to do with
the level of income and development level attained in different
countries. 
There is a remarkable similarity in the computed Pearson correlations
between the different indictors over the two periods in our study,
suggesting that the correlations are enduring and not period-specific.
13 The only exception is Child Mortality (under-5), which also features in our selection of indicators. The overall weight for this indicator in the construction of EPI is 13% (against 7.15%
under Method 1 and 4.17% under Method 2 in our calculations – see Table 8 above).  
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Table 9.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix for Indicators of Inclusive Growth (2001-05)
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Table 9.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix for Indicators of Inclusive Growth (2006-10)
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5.     Computations and Results
Table 10 presents a summary of our estimated scores for the‘Inclusive Growth Index’ (IGi) for the five North African countries for
the periods 2001-05 and 2006-10 along the lines explained above. It
also compares them with similar data computed for a select number
of Middle Eastern countries (including the GCC states) and other
developing country peers. A number of interesting patterns emerge
here.
First with the exception of Tunisia, all North African countries
underperform internationally considering that they appear in the lower
median of all countries (on a scale of 0 to 100). In North Africa, Tunisia
is followed by Egypt with Algeria and Morocco coming at the bottom
of the pecking order for both periods (Libya’s results have to be taken
cautiously given the missing data discussed above).
Tunisia (with scores for both periods over 60) overtakes the index for
China, Chile, Russia, Israel and even South Korea (Tunisia has in fact
the highest estimated score among the selected countries reported
in this Table).
A second observation concerns the IG performance trend over the
whole decade. Here, the calculation seems to suggest that Algeria’s
IG indexdeteriorated whereas the other four countries either improved
or maintained their scores between 2001-05 and 2006-10. In both
periods, Egypt did best followed by Morocco and Tunisia.
We can gain more insight by examining the data more closely for other
Middle Eastern and developing countries. Amongst the GCC states,
Saudi Arabia, followed by Oman, appear to have been least inclusive
in both periods. In terms of performance over time, Bahrain and Kuwait
did badly over the two periods. By contrast, Oman showed the greatest
improvement.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, Iran, Syria and Yemen recorded a
deteriorating trend. The biggest improvement is recorded by Iraq
between the two periods indicating the difficulties and challenges of
the early years of the war period after 2003. For most Middle Eastern
countries the IG index suffered. The worst performer was Yemen
which saw between 30%-40% deterioration in its IG index.
Among other LDCs, too, a number of interesting results emerge. Among
BRICS, China and Brazil are the strongest performers and indicate
appreciable improvement in their IG score over the periods under study
under both methods. This is in sharp contrast to South Africa, Russia
and India, where the record is mixed. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps,
Malaysia records a deteriorating trend over the two periods.
Note: 
(a) Based on Normalised Country Rankings for indicators specified in Table 6. Mean values of ranks estimated are based on arithmetic means (for details and methodology, see 
Appendix Tables 1 & 2)
Sources:  Author’s estimates based on data from WDI (2014); GII (2014b); EPI (2014) and Transparency International (2014) for the CPI (Corruption Perception Index) as specified in
Appendix Tables 1 & 2
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Table 10: Estimated 'Inclusive Growth' Scores, 2001-05 and 2006-10,
Normalised Ranks (min=0; max=100)(a) 
























China 49.6 55.0 +10.9
Chile 59.2 58.1 -1.9
Brazil 45.3 50.4 +11.3
India 34.3 36.2 +5.5
Indonesia 37.4 40.2 +7.5
South Korea 59.5 59.4 -0.2
Malaysia 68.4 59.0 -13.7
Mexico 49.2 51.4 +4.5
Russia 57.2 50.4 -11.9
South Africa 36.8 41.7 +13.3






Bottom 5 Countries 2001-05 2006-10
153 Iraq Chad
152 Congo, Dem. Rep. Eritrea
151 Liberia Guinea
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The general picture emerging here seems to suggest that oil economies
experienced deterioration in their IG scores over the period 2001-05
and 2006-10. Amongst these the most notable ones are: Algeria, Libya,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Iran and Russia. At the high end of the IG index, 
the same table also indicates that Scandinavian countries have well
performed (Iceland, Sweden and Denmark). Some East European
countries showed a strong perform (Slovakia and Poland). 
Interesting contrasts also arise between the results of the present study
and that reported in my previous paper (Hakimian 2013). In the latter,
all North African countries were found to have attained an improvement
in their IG index. By contrast, this study indicates a different picture for
Algeria which, as we saw above, has recorded a fall in its index. Moreover,
whereas both studies confirmed that Iran and Syria were among the
few MENA countries that experienced a reduction in their growth
inclusivity, the present study sheds further light on the oil economies’
experience as a whole, which – as mentioned above – fare badly between
2001 and 2010 (Kuwait, Bahrain, Iran and Algeria in particular). Another
interesting contrast emerges in the case of Yemen, which showed
improvement in the previous study but records a big drop under both
methods used in the current study, as reported above. It goes without
saying that we consider the findings of the present study as being more
robust since it extends the scope, coverage and methodology of the
last study considerably.
Table 11 gives the North African countries’ overall position in inclusive
growth international rankings. Morocco and Egypt are ranked around
80 with an improvement  between the two periods. Algeria and Libya
are ranked beyond 100. Tunisia does even better coming in the top 
30 countries globally with others at a safe distance behind. 
Table 11: Inclusive Growth Ranks for North African Countries, 
2001-05 and 2006-10







Figure 2 breaks down this broad picture into the components or
dimensions of inclusive growth underpinning our calculations. These
are: Economic (growth and the labour market indicators); Social (health
and demographic, education and gender indicators); Environmental
(EPI); Inequality (Gini and poverty gap indicators) and Governance (CPI).
In this case the same weight is given to the various sub-indices.
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It can be seen that the ‘Economic’ aspect of these countries’
performance puts them at an unfavourable comparative position
internationally: Algeria’s is the worst at near bottom (ranked 152 out of
153), followed by Libya (at 145) with others lower than 120. As we shall
see this is mainly due to inferior performance in labour market indicators
(structure of labour market and jobs creation). Comparative performance
improves in respect of other components with Tunisia again performing
best. Perhaps ironically the performance of the three countries for which
data is available (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) is best in respect of 
the ‘Inequality’ component coming in the top one-third of international
rankings. Somewhat ironically, Egypt comes on top positioned only 15
globally in terms of this component in 2006-10 (from 18 in 2001-05). 
The next section takes a closer look at relative performance of these
countries by focusing on individual indicators and offering a more detailed
sensitivity analysis of these.
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis and Policy Relevance
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 offer sensitivity analysis for the 14 indicators we
used in the construction and estimation of our IG indices for 2001-05
and 2006-10. In these figures, a baseline of 100% indicates no change
and each data point shows the re-estimated IG if a particular indicator
were to be excluded from the calculations (given a weight of zero).
Figures above 100% (baseline) indicate the indicator has a negative
effect on the overall index since its elimination (as shown in these figures)
will improve the index. The opposite is true of figures below 100% (i.e.,
they have an overall positive effect over the IG index since their elimination
lowers the IG score). 
The results here reinforce our earlier findings in respect of the broad
components of inclusive growth. In general, the employment indicators
which defined the ‘Economic’ component (especially employment-to-
population ratios) have the largest (negative) impact in all these five
countries. This is especially true of Algeria and Libya. 
On the other hand, we see again that the inclusion of the inequality
indicator (Gini) improves Egypt’s overall performance. By contrast, almost
all five countries do well in respect of the education indicators whose
elimination lowers their IG index (this is especially pronounced in the
case of Libya and Algeria). Last but not least, Morocco shows a more
varied pattern since its IG index shows sensitivity to the structure of
employment as well which indicates a smaller percentage of wage
workers (and more family workers) in its labour force. 
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Figure 2: Comparative Performance in Components of Inclusive Growth, 
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a. Includes these indicators from Tables 6 and 8: GDP per capita growth and Labour Force & Employment (Wage & Salaried as % of total employment); Employment-to-
Population Ratios, % of 15+); and Employment-to-Population Ratios, % of 15-24).
b. Includes these indicators from Tables 6 and 8: Health & Demographics (Life Expectancy at Birth; Mortality Rate Under-5, per 1,000); and Public Health Expenditure, % GDP); 
Education (Ratio of Female to Male Secondary Enrolment, %; and Public Spending on Education, % of total) and Gender (GII).
Source: Author’s calculations
With regards to policy, as shall see below, critics of composite indicators
are wary of hasty conclusions based on ‘mechanically constructed’
composite indicators as they can be misleading for policy purposes.
The value-added of such composite indicators is, ultimately, in their
ability to capture real performances. With regards to our findings above,
two points stand out with policy implications in the North African context. 
First, as is widely known, labour market issues (job creation and lowering
especially youth unemployment) remain a key challenge and the principal
route to achieving inclusive growth. Second, the performance of these
countries (with the exception of Tunisia) is consistently lack-lustre across
a wide range of dimensions and it would require a concerted effort to
improve their inclusive growth track record. A focus on one or two
selective dimensions will not be sufficient to improve their comparative
ranks. Both these are born out also by the earlier study (Hakimian, 2013).
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5.2 Uses and Limitations
We have so far offered a review of composite indicators utilised in a
variety of fields (Section 3) and applied our own methodology to estimate
such as index for inclusive growth for different countries over the two
periods of 2001-05 and 2006-10. Our methodology was based on an
aggregate average ranking of 153 countries in total in 14 selected 
areas combining growth with other dimensions such as health and
demographics, labour markets, gender, environment and governance.
The choice of the two sub-periods was informed by a desire to
understand the nature of growth experience din these countries in the
decade leading to the Arab uprisings. The results for North African
countries were presented in Section 5.   
As we have seen, the main virtue of composite indicators is their ability
to summarise complex processes in an efficient way to benchmark
country performances. But such a ‘virtue’ may be also perceived a
disadvantage, which is why it lies at the heart of the controversy over
their uses (and abuses). 
Table 12 below summarises the main pros and cons for composite
indicators. It can be seen that the perceived advantages are mainly to
Source: Author’s calculations based on Inclusive Growth computations as in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. Figures above 100% as baseline indicate a particular indicator has a negative
effect on the overall IG score and hence its elimination (as shown in these figures) will increase the index. The opposite is true of figures below 100% (i.e., the particular indicator has
an overall positive effect on the IG score if its elimination pushes IG below 100%).
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do with the parsimony in the use of data and its presentation: on one
hand, they help summarise complex data by providing a short cut to
many separate indicators and on the other hand they make the task of
assessing and monitoring country performances, across countries or
over time, easier. As such they have a strong policy appeal and tend
to be popular with policy makers who can use composite indicators to
set targets and to communicate easily and effectively with the public
over holistic topics. 
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Table 12: Pros and Cons of Composite Indicators
Source: Nardo et al (2005: 8)
• Can summarise complex or multi-dimensional issues in 
view of supporting decision-makers
• May send misleading policy messages if they are poorly 
constructed or misinterpreted
• Easier to interpret than trying to find a trend in many separate 
indicators
• May invite simplistic policy conclusions
• Facilitate the task of ranking countries on complex issues 
in a benchmarking exercise
• May be misused, e.g., to support a desired policy, if the 
construction process is not transparent and lacks sound 
statistical or conceptual principles.
• Can assess progress of countries over time on complex 
issues
• The selection of indicators and weights could be the target of 
political challenge.
• Reduce the size of a set of indicators or include more 
information within the existing size limit
• May disguise serious failings in some dimensions and increase 
the difficulty of identifying proper remedial action
• Place issues of country performance and progress at the 
centre of the policy arena
• May lead to inappropriate policies if dimensions of 
performance that are difficult to measure are ignored.
• Facilitate communication with general public (i.e. citizens, 
media, etc.) and promote accountability
Critics are, on the other hand, concerned that the quality of data used
and estimation methods applied may mask important issues and lead
to poor or inappropriate policy options. Two broad areas of criticism
have emerged. 
On one hand, some have taken up issues with the near obsession with
country rankings (the so-called ‘tyranny of international index rankings’)
that emanates from the estimation and use of composite indicators.
From this perspective, too much faith is placed on the accuracy of these
rankings. Allowing for uncertainty, for instance, Høyland et al (2012)
have shown that the link between rankings and indicators on one hand
and real performance on the other might in fact be very ‘fuzzy’ (2012: 2).
Their discussion of three common and widely used composite indicators
(Doing Business, the Human Development Index and Freedom House)
shows that the rankings in the top and bottom ends are more stable
but the middle 80% are subject to considerable uncertainty (2012: 8).
For these authors too much reliance on ‘mechanically constructed’
indicators can be misleading for policy purposes since they are poor
proxies for capturing real performance.
Another line of criticism has been articulated by those concerned with
the value-added of these ‘mashed up’ indices in offering real policy
insight. Ravallion (2010) acknowledges their appeal in ‘collapsing multiple
dimensions into just one, yielding unambiguous country rankings,’ but
warns that their ‘meaning, interpretation and robustness are often
unclear’ (2010: 2) especially compared to monitoring the components
of what has been termed ‘a large and eclectic dashboard’ of separate
indicators (Stiglitz et al, 2009, p.62). Each one of the key indicators on
a car’s dashboard (for instance, fuel level, oil pressure and battery level)
convey important data about the car’s roadworthiness and safety in
their own right. Hence, mashing up all of these into a single index as a
general indication of a car’s ‘well-being’ would not be helpful (Ncube
et al, 2013: 14). By analogy, policy makers will be better off considering
the dashboard of all the development indicators that go into a single
policy index. Two problems have been identified in this respect.
The first and main problem is ascribed to the lack of a clear and sound
aggregation function often resulting in ‘a composite index for which 
the producer is only constrained by the availability of data in choosing
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what variables to include and their weights’ (Ravallion, 2010: 3). We
encountered this issue above in our discussion of the choice of
appropriate dimensions, sub-indicators within them and problems
involved in the choice of weights. Since there is no consensus over
these, the computations methodology and assumptions made have to
be made very clear and transparent and the results have to be interpreted
with care and caution. 
The second possible drawback is that country rankings – while useful
at times in terms of focusing minds – can also encourage ‘rank-seeking
behaviour’. This happens when countries focus on specific
components of the index in which they are doing poorly as a way of
improving their ‘performance’ in the ranking tables (Høyland et al,
2010). 
Despite these legitimate concerns, however, even the hardest critics 
of composite indicators do not favour their complete abandonment. 
As articulated by Ravallion, the main lesson is probably ‘that the current
enthusiasm for new mashup indices needs to be balanced by clearer
warnings for, and more critical scrutiny from, users’ (2010: 30).
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6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has contributed to the recent debates on inclusivegrowth by offering, and applying, a methodology for calculating
a single composite index for inclusive growth for a database
consisting of 153 countries for two periods in the past decade:
2001-5 and 2006-10. The choice of these two periods was guided
by interest in understanding the dynamics and nature of growth in
the decade before the recent political upheavals in the Arab world.
The results for North African countries were presented and discussed
in comparison with other peers in the MENA region as well as some
other selected emerging economies. 
In general North African countries underperformed internationally
and appeared in the lower median of rankings for all countries. 
Tunisia (with scores for both periods rising over 60) overtakes the index
for China, Chile, Russia, Israel and South Korea. 
In the wider Middle Eastern context, oil economies in general performed
worst. 
Last but not least and with regards to policy relevance, we have to
heed the warnings of those who have cautioned against hasty
conclusions based on ‘mechanically constructed’ composite indicators
as they can be misleading for policy purposes. As we have seen, the
value-added of such composite indicators is, ultimately, in their ability
to capture real performances. In the North African context, two points
stand out with relevant policy implications. First, labour market issues
(job creation and lowering especially youth unemployment) remain a
key challenge and a principal route to achieving inclusive growth.
Second, the performance of these countries (with the exception of
Tunisia) is consistently lack-lustre across a wide range of dimensions
and it would require a concerted effort to improve their inclusive growth
track record. A focus on one or two selective dimensions will not be
sufficient to improve their comparative ranks.
To conclude, it should be emphasised that the methodology used here
should be viewed as a starting point for estimation of a single inclusive
growth estimator. Both the choice of indicators selected for our purposes
and weights attached to them are unlikely to meet with universal approval.
Nevertheless, the methodology developed and offered here is flexible
enough to incorporate other variations both for the choice of indicators
and weights applied. In that respect, it is hoped that this approach will
encourage wider methodological debate and can prove useful in
stimulating attempts at operationalising this important concept. 
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Appendix
Table 1: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators
(averaged for 2001-05)












































Algeria 42 89 86 80 74 151 146 21
Egypt 95 90 95 104 71 142 136 98 56
Libya 70 59 75 94 140 143 12
Morocco 44 93 101 135 95 128 92 106 35
Tunisia 60 58 73 77 57 147 135 30 20
GCC States
Bahrain 145 39 46 88 4 56 96 8
Kuwait 34 52 48 91 2 30 101 63 25
Oman 127 51 51 87 113 122 90 77
Qatar 109 31 43 98 1 13 50 25 125
Saudi Arabia 124 55 57 76 125 152 100 12
UAE 149 40 39 125 3 16 61
Other Middle East
Iran 36 86 85 110 145 126 96 57
Iraq 110 88 98 141 153 149 122
Israel 139 8 23 37 19 116 128 72 14
Jordan 45 67 74 42 36 149 147 40
Lebanon 142 34 56 65 64 141 134 32 114
Syria 68 48 64 105 84 135 113 99 46
Turkey 55 74 83 62 80 139 103 115 105
Yemen 107 115 117 107 75 146 119 132 4
Other LDCs
China 6 56 84 123 22 25 93
Chile 63 26 38 75 58 114 132 55 88
Brazil 104 80 80 72 63 48 34 75
India 27 113 115 147 108 80 64 112 96
Indonesia 56 96 103 149 99 54 74 73 109
South Korea 38 28 25 84 61 65 110 69 71
Malaysia 71 57 35 118 46 62 66 23 9
Mexico 134 42 65 89 62 81 52 48 58
Russia 19 104 60 69 7 88 100 71 90
South Africa 131 111 67 37 143 150 28 48
Rank out of 152 153 152 153 32 153 153 153 132
Missing Countries 1 0 1 0 121 0 0 18 21
Total Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
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Table 1 Cont’d: Inclusive Growth Index Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators
(averaged for 2001-05)
Gender Environment Labour Force & Employment Governance Inclusive Growth 
Index (IGi)(a)









Gini Index Poverty Gap





Algeria 97 77 35.9
Egypt 113 51 15 30 73 43.3
Libya 44 104 118 34.1
Morocco 106 76 49 35 74 43.8
Tunisia 42 53 53 20 39 61.4
GCC States
Bahrain 43 58 29 49.0
Kuwait 70 63 41 56.8
Oman 93 27 31.2
Qatar 39 34 46.7
Saudi Arabia 126 37 59 35.5
UAE 108 17 31 41.0
Other Middle East
Iran 95 81 37 22 87 44.0
Iraq 133 125 132 11.1
Israel 25 34 42 23 59.8
Jordan 104 52 39 23 38 52.9
Lebanon 73 87 29.2
Syria 91 57 26 29 69 49.6
Turkey 79 70 60 24 76 45.0
Yemen 132 134 35 52 105 27.9
Other LDCs
China 6 56 22 25 49.6
Chile 63 26 58 114 132 59.2
Brazil 104 80 63 48 34 45.3
India 27 113 108 80 64 34.3
Indonesia 56 96 99 54 74 37.4
South Korea 38 28 61 65 110 59.5
Malaysia 71 57 46 62 66 68.4
Mexico 134 42 62 81 52 49.2
Russia 19 104 7 88 100 57.2
South Africa 131 37 143 150 36.8
Rank out of 133 152 97 95 144 153
Missing Countries 20 1 56 58 9 0
Total Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153
Source: Author’s calculations
Notes:
(a) The overall inclusive scores for each country (IGi) are computed as a geometric mean for that country of the standardised values for different
indicators (defined below) according to the following formula:
IGi =  ∑wj .sji 
where: (i = 1,… m:  country i included in the dataset); 
(j = 1,… n:  indicator j included in the dataset); and 
sj is a standardised score for the rankings obtained in respect of indicator j for country i. These standardised scores are obtained using the 
following formula (for each indicator for each country):
sji = 100 .     i
where rj is a country’s rank in respect of indicator j in (descending order) and mj is  the total number of countries for which data for indicator
sj is available. Methods 1 & 2 are explained in Table 8 above.
Sources: WDI (2014); GII (2014b); EPI (2014) and Transparency International (2014) for the CPI (Corruption Perception Index).
m
i=1
A f r i c a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k
38
AfDB
W o r k i n g  P a p e r
North Africa Policy Series



























22. Hong Kong SAR
23. Isle of Man
24. Kiribati
25. Korea, Dem. Rep.
26. Kosovo   
27. Liechtenstein  
28. Macao  
29. Marshall Islands
30. Micronesia  
31. Monaco
32. Myanmar
33. New Caledonia  
34. Northern Mariana Islands
35. Palau
36. Papua New Guinea  
37. Puerto Rico  
38. Samoa  
39. San Marino
40. Sao Tome and Principe  
41. Seychelles  
42. Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
43. Solomon Islands  
44. Somalia
45. South Sudan
46. St. Kitts and Nevis
47. St. Lucia 
48. St. Martin (French part)










59. Virgin Islands (U.S.)
60. West Bank and Gaza
61. Zimbabwe 
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Table 2: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators (aver-
aged for 2006-10)












































Algeria 117 89 87 88 100 148 137 30 76
Egypt 35 91 91 117 72 137 127 85 95
Libya 71 56 71 132 138 140 4
Morocco 47 93 100 130 91 131 107 111 38
Tunisia 51 57 73 81 58 143 135 19 15
GCC States
Bahrain 148 42 48 89 3 50 96 69 113
Kuwait 151 60 50 120 34 108 58 96
Oman 39 46 55 124 2 108 114 99 85
Qatar 97 34 43 119 1 4 10 2 129
Saudi Arabia 49 51 54 97 124 153 105 34
UAE 153 40 45 134 4 17 44
Other Middle East
Iran 54 80 81 101 82 147 130 87 64
Iraq 53 98 103 91 152 146 124
Israel 74 1 23 47 20 109 117 53 27
Jordan 44 71 82 35 35 149 144 43
Lebanon 15 31 51 83 70 138 136 55 133
Syria 96 50 63 129 75 145 123 66 60
Turkey 86 67 67 55 74 141 106 109 119
Yemen 106 116 117 136 63 146 118 132 53
Other LDCs
China 2 53 68 116 27 38 49
Chile 79 28 44 84 54 107 115 45 97
Brazil 57 79 69 68 66 48 35 40
India 11 114 114 150 107 96 82 108 106
Indonesia 37 94 101 152 99 55 77 60 111
South Korea 52 21 19 72 59 73 124 72 69
Malaysia 76 58 39 127 49 83 84 73 65
Mexico 115 39 66 90 65 77 56 28 62
Russia 46 104 57 71 7 75 91 88
South Africa 121 139 115 67 34 142 150 38 39
Rank out of 153 153 153 153 112 153 153 138 138
Missing Countries 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 15 15
Total Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
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Table 2 Cont’d: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Rankings for Selective Indicators
(averaged or 2006-10)
Gender Environment Labour Force & Employment Governance Inclusive Growth 
Index (IGi)(a)









Gini Index Poverty Gap





Algeria 91 80.0 91 32.1
Egypt 113 44.0 10 30 92 46.7
Libya 44 103.0 34.3
Morocco 89 75.0 49 32 72 44.9
Tunisia 48 48.0 32 26 53 62.3
GCC States
Bahrain 42 71.0 37 45.7
Kuwait 43 69.0 35 40.3
Oman 92.0 36 41.0
Qatar 100 39.0 50 24 56.5
Saudi Arabia 127 34.0 58 40.8
UAE 67 22.0 29 44.6
Other Middle East
Iran 98 83.0 113 32.2
Iraq 129 129.0 11 34 129 25.4
Israel 23 36.0 61.9
Jordan 99 54.0 28 16 54.0
Lebanon 77.0 36.8
Syria 101 58.0 120 33.4
Turkey 75 63.0 45 23 54 46.9
Yemen 134 136.0 27 16.9
Other LDCs
China 33 101.0 54 48 68 55.0
Chile 60 30.0 77 24 22 58.1
Brazil 72 72.0 81 39.0 66 50.4
India 120 134.0 21 64 36.2
Indonesia 96 98.0 27 59 72 40.2
South Korea 10 42.0 59.4
Malaysia 40 45.0 66 11 59.0
Mexico 68 62.0 70 22 74 51.4
Russia 50 67.0 53 3 131 50.4
South Africa 79 74.0 88 51 46 41.7
Rank out of 134 152 88 68 152
Missing Countries 19 1 65 85 1
Total Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes and Sources as for Appendix Table 1
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Table 3: Country Rankings for Inclusive Growth Composite Indices
(2001-05 and 2006-100)




























Cape Verde 94 72





Congo, Dem. Rep. 152 148
Congo, Rep. 141 142
Costa Rica 34 17




Czech Republic 25 32
Denmark 10 5
Dominican Republic 78 68
Ecuador 83 81
A f r i c a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k
42
AfDB
W o r k i n g  P a p e r
North Africa Policy Series
2 0 1 6  •  w w w . a f d b . o r g
2001-05 Labour Force & Employment
Egypt, Arab Rep. 84 74































Korea, Rep. 37 34
Kuwait 46 93
Kyrgyz Republic 95 85
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Russian Federation 43 63
Rwanda 93 86
Saudi Arabia 107 91
Senegal 111 127
Serbia 59 56
Sierra Leone 134 150
Singapore 27 26
Slovak Republic 8 1
Slovenia 2 21
South Africa 102 87
Spain 26 35




Syrian Arab Republic 60 117
Tajikistan 96 102
Tanzania 117 99
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2001-05 Labour Force & Employment
Thailand 44 46
Togo 149 131





United Arab Emirates 92 79
United Kingdom 15 23
United States 28 38
Uruguay 50 15
Venezuela, RB 85 75
Vietnam 77 65
Yemen, Rep. 128 149
Zambia 126 129
Total Number of Countries 153 153
Notes: Figures refer to individual country ranks for computed Inclusive Growth Index out of 153 countries (see Appendix Tables 1 &2 for methodology)
Source: Author’s calculations
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